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EACH year, more American farmland is being con-
verted to nonfarm uses such as highways, houses, air-
ports, and shopping centers. This development has
engendered fear that the decline in farmland will
eventually produce a severe crisis for U.S. food
production.
A recent study, in which 11 U.s. government agen~
des participated, stated: “Every day in the United
States, four square miles of our nation’s prime farm
lands are shifted to uses other than agriculture. The
thief is urban sprawl. *..Ten years from now,
Americans could be as concerned over the loss of the
nation’s prime and important farm lands as they are
today over shortages of oil and gasoline.”1
Leading proponents of the shrinking farmland thesis
contend that decisions to convert agricultural land to
‘Where Have the Farmlands Gone? (Washington, D.C. Na-
tional Agricultural Land Studies, September 1979), pp. 1-2.
Similar views were expressed hi The Farm and The City (The
American Assembly, Columbia University, April 10-13, 1980),
and in Erick P. Eckholm, Lo&ing Ground: Environmental
Stress and World Food Prospects (New York: IV. W. Norton
and Company, Inc., 1976), pp. 183-86.
nonagricultural uses should he transferred from the
private to the public sector. Michael Brewer states:
“Each choice [by individual farmers to sell farmland
to developers) may be sensible in its own context.
But, collectively, they reduce the country’s capacity
to produce food, fiber, and wood.” He argues: “The
first step is to ‘find out’ •.. what tools are available
to local, state and Federal governments to deal with
it.”2 Lester Brown concludes: . it [cropland] can
be protected from competing nonfarm demands only
through land use planning.”3
In contrast to these views, this article asserts that
the arguments for social planning of land use are
erroneous. First, there is no evidence that the quan-
tity of cropland is shrinking or that shortages of food
are imminent. Furthermore, even if the alleged prob-
km did exist, there is no evidence that it could be
solved more efficiently by social planning than by
market participants.
2
Where Have the Farmlands Gone?, p. 6.
~I1aid., p. 14.
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Some Arguments For Social Land Use Planning
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offset by other factors of production, a constant or
rising demand for food coupled with a declining quan-
tity of prime cropland would lead to declining farm
production and risingfarm commodity andfood prices
relative to prices of other products. Finally, if food is
becoming more scarce relative to nonfood products,
given a relatively inelastic demand for food (a one
percent change in the supply of farm products results
in a larger than one percent change in price), a ris-
ing proportion of disposable personal income (per-
sonal income after taxes) would be spent on food.
In other words, with a fixed relationship between land
and farm production, a reduction in the real quantity
of eropland with a constant or rising demand for food
leads to rising farm product and food prices, higher
real food costs, and a smaller percent of personal
income available for nonfood purchases. Although, all
of the above would be implied if a shrinking farmland
crisis actually existed, none of these events is consis-
tent with the data.
Quantity of Gropland Difficult to Measure
As Theodore %V. Schultz noted, economic analysis
of land is not a simple matter. “Land as an economic
variable is exceedingly hard to get at. .. The fact
that land is open and aboveboard, physical and con-
crete, and legally divided into neat, carefully de-
scribed pai-ce]s or lots does not help one deter-
mine the supply of land.”4
In the early iSOOs, economists such as Thomas Ma!-
thus and David Ricardo considered the contribution
of land to food production to be relalively fixed and
concluded that the real value of food would inevitably
rise along with population growth, eventually neces-
sitating the use of poorer land, more machines, and
more labor to produce additional food. Consequently,
food prices and rent woiild rise relative to other
prices.5 While this view recognized that cropland did
not refer to a fixed number of acres, the potential
real output of the land was assumed to be predeter-
mined and relatively fixed.°It is now recognized that
4
Theodore W. Sehultz, The Econnmic Organization of Agri-
culture (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc., 1953),
p. 145.
5
David Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy and Tax-
ation, ed. Ernest flhys (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co.,
Inc., 1948), p. 280; and Thomas Robert Maithus, On Popu-
lation (New York: The Modern Library, published by Ran~
dom House, 1960), pp. 12, 13, 32, and 33.
6
David Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy and Tax-
ation, pp. 80-81. For a discussion of classical views, see
Harry G. Johnson, Theory of Income Di&tribvtion (London:
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able 1
Total (ES Land Area~Farmland, CroptantL, and Crop Yields
MiU~onsofacres
Oroplaad VieW per acre
Date Total rand Land in farms 1967 100
910 1934 679 317
1920 1934 351 61
1934 9G0 380 83
1940 1934 iQas 331 62
1950 L934 1 161 336 69
1959 2j314 1,124 317 85
Z314 lilO 292 95
1969 2314 tooa 286 106
974 2316 1017 322 104
1919 2,316 1049 337 13Q
9nelude Alas andfta~ai1~b gnmii~~th 1959
ouree~S tzUsbcai Mi twt of the tin d State (Washngton D~C. U$ Departm nt of
Commerce Burea of the Censa J9i~) 00th S p 8 Ag etd at Statzs*i s
(Wa bingt n DC US Depsrbns~t of Agneultur ) 197 419, 1979 p 411
ChangsMFam odctwnand ffict (Wabigon DC U .1.) atthzen
of Agneulture 197&) p 19 Agmc It ral 0 tkiok Washmgton, CU Depart
aent of AgricuJture~,Crop Product o 1979 Annwzl Sun~ev(Washing on DC
US Depgz-ttaent of Agncuiture~Jarnrniy 19 0).
the surface area that can he used for crops is more and the Obion River Valley in Tennessee, much of
variable than Maithus and Ricardo thought and that which was developed into cropland through con-
output per unit of surface area is likewise more struction of a drainage system. Further, although
vanable. there is a vast amount of acreage (such as grazing,
range, or forest land) that is not currently used for
cropland at present prices, this acreage could be con-
Acres of Cropland Variable but Increasing verted to crop production within a short period of
Despite the difficulty of estimating the amount of time if it was profitable to do so. If the net return on
cropland, it is now evident that the amount is not an acre of land is greater when used for crop produc-
fixed. Rather, the quantity actually in use at any tion than when used for grazing, it will be used
given time depends on a number of factors. for crops. Conversely, if the expected net return on
land is greater when it is used for purposes such as
Because new technology reduces land development grazing, forestry, etc., the land will be used for these
costs and/or increases crop yields, thus providing nurnoses
favorable returns on the investment, land areas cur- r £
rently used for other purposes can be developed into As shown in table 1, only a small portion of the
profitable cropTand. As Martin Bailey noted: .. U.S. land area is currently used for crops. Of the 2.3
mountainous land good only for grazing could be billion acres of land in the nation, only about 40 per-
leveled and made amble, and marshy lands, lake cent is farmland and less than one third of this farm-
bottom and the fringes of the ocean could be filled to land has been actually used for crop production.
make arable land.”7 Examples of such conversion in Hence, a large amount of land area is available for
the U.S. include the Imperial Valley in California, conversion to or from crop production.
which was irrigated and developed into cropland,
Data on cropland harvested rnthcate that sizable
7
Martin J, Bailey, National Income and The Price Lettel (New changes have occurred during the past 80 years in
York: McGraw iii Book Company, Inc., 1962), p. iii. terms of the land area used for crop production. Acres
13harvested rose from 317 million in 1910 to a peak of
360 million in 1930. By 1969, acres harvested had de-
clined to 286 million hut increased again ill the 1970s
and rose to 337 million in 1979. Although government
production contro’ and crop diversion programs re-
duced the acreage of some crops harvested from 1934
through 1974, the effectiveness of these programs in
terms of total crops harvested can he overemphasized
since production of uncontrolled crops on diverted
acres was permitted in most years. Furthermore, the
impact of these production controls has been sharply
reduced since 1969.
The change in acres of crops harvested has been
positively correlated with the change in farm product
prices relative to other prices. For example, when the
eropland acreage was declining (0.8 percent per year
during the two decades, 1950-69), the index of prices
received by farmers declined rdative to other prices
(table 2). During this same period, farm commodity
prices rose only 0.2 percent per year — 1.4 percentage
points less per year than the prices of industrial corn-
modifies or the producers price index, 2 percentage
points less than the consumer price index, and 2.4
percentage points less than the GNP price deflator.
Durillg 1969-79, however, when the number of acres
of crops harvested was rising, prices received by
farmers rose at a slightly faster rate than most other
prices. For example, during the 1969-79 decade, farm
prices rose at an annual rate of 8.5 percent per year,
compared with 8.3 percent for industrial commodities
and less than 8 percei~tfor each of the other series.
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This relative increase in farm prices provided farmers
with sufficient incentive to convert additional land
to crop production.
The increase in farm product prices relative to other
prices during 1969-79 is not an indication of potential
famine either in the U.S. or abroad. Rather, it repre-
sents a rise in export demand for U.S. farm products,
attributable primarily to a gradual reduction in for-
eign trade restrictions (that began prior to World War
H) and to the large volume of U.S. currency
lations abroad (resulting from U.S. petroleum imports
following the sharp increase in petroleum prices).8 The
U.S. farm sector, having a comparative advantage in
production of farm products (it is relatively cheaper
in terms of resources used to produce farm products
in the U.S. than in other countries), exported an in-
creasing proportion of total farm output.
Yields Per Acre Rising
While output per acre of cropland varies from year
to year as a result of weather and other short-mn
factors, the sharp increases in crop yields over the
longer run indicate that yields are sensitive to other
factors of production such as technology and prices.
The development of new technology and/or a change
in the price of crops relative to the cost of farm inputs
leads to a change in output per acre. For example,
new technology that reduces the real cost of ferti-
lizers, improves insect and plant disease control, and
provides improved seeds increases output per acre
and, consequently, has the same impact on output as
an increase in the acreage of farmland. In essence,
the increase in farmland “quality” produces the same
result as an increase in quantity. Similarly, an increase
in the price of crops relative to the returns on land
from alternative uses provides farmers with incentive
for using more yield-increasing factors (e.g., greater
quantities of fertilizer) per acre, as well as for using
more acres of land for crop production. With the
increase i.n the value of farm products in the early
197Os as a result of rising foreign demand, greater
cIuant~tiesof yield-increasing inputs were added to
cropland; consequently, yields increased as did the
number of acres harvested.
The use of yield-increasing factors caused average
corn yields to rise from 70 bushels per acre in the
three years, 1964-66, to 100 bushels per acre in 1977-
79, despite the increase in acres harvested during the
8
See Clifton B. Luttrell, ‘Rising Farm Exports and Interna-
tional Trade Policies,” this Review (July 1979), pp. 3-10.
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Table 2
Changes in Cropland Harvested and
Selected Prices (Annual Rates)
195O-6~ 1969-79
Acres harvested 08 1 7
Prices recewed by farmers 0.2 85
Price of industrial commothties 1 6
GNP pnce deflator 2.6
Consumer price ndex (su tems) 2.2 7.1
Producer price index
(finished goods) 1.6 73
Source Economic Report of th President (Washington,
DC: Lnited S ate Government Pnnting Office
1980) pp 208 250, 205, 268 312, Changes n
Farm Piod~tion and Efficiency (Washington
D~C;U S Department of Agneulture, 1978), p. 19.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS OCTOBER 1980
Table S
Rates of Change of Selected Prices, Per Capita Personal Income, Percent of
Personal Income Spent on Food, and Percent of Farm Commodity Sates Exported
and Imported
1950 60 1960-70 1970-79 195O-~79
Prtce rate of change.
Recetved by farmers (USDA)’ 08 1.5 9 I 3.0
Food (CPQ’ 17 27 t2 4.0
All commothties less food (CPD1 1.4 1 9 63 3 1
AR services (CPQ’ 3.6 3.8 76 49
industrt& commodities (PPI) 2.0 1 4 3.9
Disposable persona! income per capita
(rate of change)2 36 5.6 9.2 60
Percent spent on total food2 224— 20.2 20.2 173 17.3— 22.4 16.6
foodathome
2
17~S 161 161 134 134 125 17.8—125
Percent oftota’ farm commodity sates:
Exported8 10.1 141 14.1—146 14.6 24.8 101 248
Imported~ 14M—11.1 111—11.4 11 4—12S 14.0—12.6
1Economzc Repoit of the Piesident (Washington DC US Government Printing Office, 1979) pp. 240, 248 290 Eco-
nomic Indicators (Washington, D.C. U.S Department of kg jcWtur , 1980), CPI (Consume Puce Index); and PH
(Producer Price Index),
2Nqtional Food Review (Washington, D.C: U.S Department of Agriculture Winter 1980) pp 6, 56; and Economic
Indicator8.
8Economic R port of thePresident (Washington, D.C.. U.S. Govemm ut Printing OfRee 1979) pp. 287 and 2%; U.S. Foreign
Agneultucal Trade Statistical R~poft(Washington DC: U.S Department of Agriculture 1970) p 2 Agnculffirat Outlook
(Was1ungtox~DC. U.S. Department of Agneulture),
latter period.9 As shown ill table 1 the trend rise in
crop yields is not limited to corn. Yields of all ciop-
land harvested rose from an average index of 83 in
19o7-59 to 123 in 1977-79 an increase of 48 percent.
Furthermore, there is no indication that a slos lug
has occurred in the trend growth of crop yields. From
1967-69 to 1977-79 crop production per acre iose at
a 1.7 percent rate, well above the 1.1 percent rate of
increase from 1910 to 1969.’°
°AgriculturalStatistics (Washington D.C. T~ .S. Department
of Agriculture, 1979) p. 30 and Agricultural Outlook (Wash-
thgton D.C.: U.S. Department of Agricnltur May 1980)
p 33.
10A rate of yield growth higher than that of 1969-79 was
r alized only in the decade of 1950-60, when output per
acre rose at a 2.6 perecift rat . During th. 1950 60 ~eetde,
however, the number of ¶eres harvested declined sharp1~
indicating that less fertile acres were taken out of crop
production.
Shrinkage Not Indicated by Relative
Prices of Food
During the period, 1950-79, farm product prices
rose at a slower rate than other major price series
and only half as fast as disposable personal income
(table 3). Consequently, the proportion of disposable
personal income spent on food declined from 22.4per-
cent in 1950 to 16.6 percent in 1979.
During the more recent decade, 1970.79, fann prod-
uct prices rose somewhat faster than prices of most
noufarm products. Farm prices rose at a 9.1 percent
rate, slightly faster than the 8.9 percent rate for in-
A number of recent studies point to a possible decline in
the rate of growth in crop yields in the years ahead. Agri-
en/turd Prodnction Efficiency (Washington, D.C.; National
Academy of Sciences, 1975), p. 195. This study concluded
that biological realities suggest a slowing of the rate of in-
crease in productivity for most crops. Yoa-chi Lu, Philip Cline,
and Leroy Quance, Prospects for Productivity Growth in U.S.
Agriculture (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Agri-
culture, September 1979). The authors expressed doubt that
agricultural productivity growth through the year 2000 will
equal the historical rate unless research and extension invest-
ment increase a~dunprecedented technologies develop.
On the other hand, Glen L. Johnson contends that agri-
culture has a high long-mn supply elasticity in The Over~
production Trap in Agriculture, ed. Glen L. Johnson and
Leroy Quance (Baltimore The John Hopkins University
Press, 1972), pp. 20 and 183. Furthermore, he argues that
if demand (for farn~products) was doubled or tripled, we
would have so much money invested in land that earnings
would not cover acquisition costs.
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Table 4
Rates of Change of Specified Prices, Per Capita Personal
Income, Percent of Personal Income Spent on Food,
and Percent of Farm Commodity Sales Exported and Imported
in the First and Second Half of the 1970s
1970-75 1975-79
Prices . rdtc of change:
Rccc;ved by farmers ~LJSDA) 11.0 6.8
Food ~GPl) 8.8 7.5
All cornrnodilios less ood (CPI) 5.8 7.0
All services (CPfl 6.5 89
fridustrial ccrv.rnodivos ~PPI) 9.3 8.3
Disposable personal jr-come par capita
(rate of change) 8.7 9.7
Percent spent on: total food 1 7.3 -—17.0 17.0—-i 6.6
food at home 13.4 —-13.0 13.0 -—12.5
Pcrcon~& ~oIaltarn’ commodity sa’e~-
Exported 14.6 ----25.2 25.2—— 24.8
mported 11.4 —- 10.6 10.6 -- 12.6
dustrial commodities, and ~veI1above the rate of in-
crease for all commodities (less food) and for all
services. The relative increase in farm product pi-ices
during this decade, however, was related to a sharp
increase in demand for U.S. Faim products, primarily
for export, rather than to a shrinkage in eropland.
(There is no evidence that farmland conversion to
urban uses was greater in 1970-79 than in any other
post-World War H decade.) Exports started rising in
the 1950s, rose moderately in the 1960s, and acceler-
ated sharply in the 1970s. For instance the rate of
increase was relatively low in the 1950s and the 1960s,
and exports totaled oniy 14.6 percent of saTes in 1970.
However, exports accelerated from 14.6 percent of
total sales in 1970 to 25.2 percent in 1975 (table 4).
Furthermore, sharp increases in farm commodity ex-
ports were not offset by rising imports of farm corn-
modifies. Farm commodity imports declined from 11.4
to 10.6 percent of sales of farm products during the
period.
increased at about the same rate as disposable per-
sonal income in the first half of the 1970s, rose 2.2
percentage points slower in the second half of the
decade than did disposable personal income.
As indicated earlier, much of the increase in fann
exports since the mid-1950s can be attributed to a
gradual reduction in foreign trade restrictions, which
had been almost prohibitive following the Smoot-
Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. A number of major reduc-
tions in average ad valorern rates have been nego-
tiated since the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade; numerous studies show that these reduc-
tions have a major impact on trade,11 However, re-
ductions in tariff duties do not increase trade imme-
diately, as evidenced by the gradual rise in exports
during the 1950s and 1960s. Part of the sharp increase
in exports dining the early 1970s may be attributed
to the implementation of monopolistic petroleum poi-
icies by the OPEC nations, which resulted in a sharp
increase in dollar accumulations abroad and the dol-
lar’s reduced value in terms of foreign currencies. By 1975, farm commodity exports as a percent of
sales had leveled off, and farm commodity prices be-
gan to decline again relative to other prices (table Despite the accelerating export demand for US.
4). From 1975 to 1979, farm commodity prices rose farm products, however, the farm sector concurrently
at the rate of 6.8 percent, 2.1 percentage poillts less produced enough food to maintain relatively stable
than the rate of increase in the price of all services
and 1.5 percentage points less than the price of in- “See Clifton B. Luttrell, ‘Rising Fann Exports and Interna-
dustrial commodities. The price of food, which had tional Trade Policies,” pp. 6-7.
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real prices for food in the U.S., further reducing the
proportion of disposable personal income spent on
food.
Little Basis for Cropland Preservation Plans
Considering the facts that cropland acreage is not
shrinking, crop yields have increased, and food costs
as a percent of personal income have declined, all&
gations of a “shrinking” farmland appear to be un-
founded. Consequently, the arguments for develop-
ing comprehensive social plans to convert cropland to
urban uses have little validity. Moreover, it is impor-
tant to note that, even if the claims of reduced farm-
land had been substantiated, proponents of social
cropland control have not made a convincing case for
such action. There are certain circumstances that
might call for social land use planning: (1) if farmers
are not price conscious, i.e., they are not responsive
to current or expected future crop prices since they
do not recognize the real value of prime eropland;
(2) if farmland prices do not reflect the true value of
the product of the land; and (3) if social planners’
knowledge about future land values is silpenor to that
of current landowners and developers.
Existing evidence does not corroborate the validity
of these circumstances. Research clearly indicates that
farmers are highly responsive to current and expected
future prices.12 They sell their land to urban devel-
opers because its value is greater if used for urbaniza-
lion purposes than for eropland (cropland value being
determined by the current and expected future p-ices
of the crops grown on it). When the value of land
converted to urban use exceeds the value obtained
from farming, the farm owner, land developer, and
the general public will profit from conversion.’3 In
the absence of harmful neighborhood effects (hidden
costs), the costs and benefits of such shifts are care-
fully assessed by the transacting parties. In other
words, the cost to the individual and to society is the
foregone value of the land’s contribution to farm out-
put. Unless the gain in the new use exceeds the loss,
the individuals involved would have no incentive for
making the change.
The second argument for social planning — that
prices alone do not reflect the true value of the prod-
uct — implies that neighborhood effects are an impor-
tant factor. Some external costs, such as reduced water
quality and impaired landscapes, havebeen mentioned
b the proponents of social control over cropland.
However, this argument is subjective because one can
easily visualize rural scenes that are quite the oppo-
site of the beautiful landscape ideally depicted by
advocates of social control. Cattle feeding pens, swine
producing areas, and other livestock facilities are often
sources of pollution. In addition, other “unsightly”
views associated with farming communities include
dilapidated buildings, fences, and equipment dumped
along the roadside.
In regard to water quality, most authorities contend
that both rural and urban uses may result in water
poilution. Those types of pollution that result from
farming activities include runoff from livestock hab-
itats and chemicals used for controlling crop diseases,
insects, and weeds. Allen Kneese contends that agri-
cultural chemicals present a special (pollutants) prob-
lem “as they are delivered to streams in storm runoff
from the land and bypass waste treatment plants.”14
The third argument for social planning — that social
planners possess superior knowledge compared to that
of private individuals — implies that individual
farmers and urban land users distribute their resources
between the present and the future on a relatively
uninformed (of truevalue) basis. in other words,indi-
vidual landowners are perceived to be somewhat
myopic in assessing the future value of cropland,
whereas social land use planilers can clearly foresee
the “correct” future value of land in its various a1ter~
native uses. This argument fails to consider that such
vision would provide soda! planners with amazing
opportunities for personal investment gains so that
they would not he likely to remain “planners” when
they could become wealthy as “doers.”
Of even greater importance for the public welfare,
however, is the assumption by proponents of social
planning that such programs operate in the “public
interest” rather than in self-interest. There is little
ji~stificationfor the view that sell-interest is eliminated
when social groups are given monopoly power over
economic functions. As pointed out so cogently by
George Stigler, alleged market failures are not evi-
dence that social planners can provide more services
l
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at reduced costs. “We may tell the society to jump out
of the market frying pan, but we have no basis for
predicting whether it will land ~nthe fire or a luxur-
ious bed.”5 Any impediment to the transfer of crop-
land to urban use will increase the cost of land for
housing, factories, hospitals, parking, and other uses
vital to the public well-being. There is no evidence
that social groups can more equitably resolve the
conflict between costs and benefits of land use than
can private markets.
SUMMARY
As prime farmland is converted into streets, shop-
ping centers, and residential areas, observers conclude
that the quantity of farmland is declining sharply and
that this decline should be controlled by social action.
Unobserved, however, are the less noticeable but dra-
‘
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University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 113. For a further
discussion of this problem, see H. H. Coase, ‘The Problem
of Social Cost,” The Journal of Law and Economics (Oc-
tober 1960), pp. 1-49; and Roger Leroy Miller, Economics
Toddy (San Francisco: Canfield Press, 1976), pp. 615-23.
matie increases in acres of cropland and in produc-
tion per acre. The number of acres from which crops
were harvested rose from the 1969 low point of 286
million to 337 million acres in 1979. Yields per acre
of cropland rose at a 1.1 percent rate from 1910 to
1969 and at a 1.7 percent rate during the period from
1967-69 to 1977-79.
As a consequence of the increase in acres harvested
and in yields per acre, farm product and food prices
have consistently declined relative to other prices, ex-
cept during the first half of the 1970s when export
demand rose sharply. Since 1950, consumers have
spent a declining proportion of their disposable per-
sonal income on food, even while a larger proportion
of domestic farm output was being exported.
Consequently, there is no justification for using
social action to preserve cropland as proposed by
critics of the current land market system. Further-
more, even if there was some shrinkage in cropland,
there is no evidence that the problem can be solved
more efficiently by social action than it can be in the
market place.
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